Iraqi Letters

I do not believe control of Iraqi oil is compatible with the support by Bush for democracy in Iraq. It is much easier to negotiate with a dictator, as is done with the KSA goverment, than it is to deal with the leaders of a goverment which must respect the wishes of their citizens to keep their jobs. However, security between nations is strengthed through democracy.
 
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Hello Abu Khaleel,
Bush and Cheney were both oil industry executives, so they have a special interest in Iraq's national resource. Americans don't want to recognize that our civilization is on a precipice. All this easy talk about democracy and freedom is grounded on an energy addicted technology, based on oil and natural gas which are rapidly becoming exhausted. This year may be the year of 'peak oil', when worldwide oil/gas production begins to decline every where.(Gas situation may be even more serious). There are no substitutes(our cars can't run on coal, or homes heated by coal, which will run out soon as well). Nuclear fusion is a pipe dream, nuclear fission is a terrorist/environmental threat(and uranium is limited as well). What will happen to a mass consumer society without oil and gas? In pre-industrial civilizations, the only answer was slavery (of most people). Now, what happens when people realize that the party is over? They will turn back to the style of the 'sole leader' and away from democracy. US administrations from long before Bush have worried about the orderly supply of oil, but now that oil supplies are on the decline maybe the strategy has changed to a non-cooperative one.
Therefore it would be essential to put Iraq's oil fields into production as soon as possible and if possible control them to regulate the prices, or so the 'logic' would seem to dictate.
 
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Dear Abu Khaleel,
control of oil was for sure one of the undeclared reasons for the invasion, but only if one qualifies it.
The Marxist - economicistic 'No blood for oil' view seems to have more faults than confirmation for the present US military adventures; and there was little oil in Vietnam in the Fifties, Sixties & Seventies, and none in Somalia, 1992-94.
I do not believe that money is the undeclared reason behind all human history; but, for sure, you can sell the rightness of your crazy plans for power (a much stronger reason) to greedy people (like the US corporations & oil companies supporting Bush & his team) putting in front of their eyes the chances of big economical gains, real or fake.
In this way Hitler sold his madness to the German industrialists & businessmen; people who would have done anything to stop him if they had had an inkling of his real aims.

I honestly believe that the invasion of Iraq had very little to do with 'stealing Iraqi oil'; and that Bremer's decrees had more to do with what they call, with one of those anodine terms redolent of Nazism, 'nation-building', i.e. with creating anew an Iraq being economically, legally & socially a little US of A (so mad free-market, economic power to the big international corporations, little or no social guarantees & social security, no planning functions for the State).

The oil of Iraq (and of neighbouring countries) entered the power-driven US calculations, in my opinion, in another way: the aim was for sure to gain control of oil, but mainly, for the next few lustres or decades, in the form of a power of interdiction, i.e. of being able to cut out, or to blackmail, other oil consuming countries (countries like China or the EU, for instance), and to control the entire international market of the commodity.
The aim being not economical gain, but strategical advantage, on the world scale.
 
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Hello,
I´ll agree with the "soft power" advocates. 'Stealing' the oil is not the issue, but 'leveraging' it. In this context, the US has an interest in gaining direct control over a 'swing capacity' which is today uniquely owned by Saudia Arabia and forms the core of OPEC power.
If the US succeed in gaining control over a flexible oil capacity that can approach SA´s swing capacity they can effectively dissolve OPEC as the cartel has no more use when it cannot influence the price range by itself. To reach this, the US would need to significantly increase the amount of oil coming out of Iraq over the pre-war rate, but the numbers that the war planners were throwing around in 2003 - expecting to quikcly reach 5mbpd - would have come close. And maybe they were expecting to add Iran soon...
Now the question is, what would the US want with control over the swing capacity, besides undermining OPEC, and securing themselves against possible turmoil in Saudi Arabia? The intent is *not* to enforce significantly lower oil prices as an end in itself, as the US economy does perfectly well with prices as they were before the Iraq invasion and even runs acceptably well at a $50 level. Instead, US-dominated control of the oil price as others have observed gives an option to blackmail and punish China (much less so the EU). From the US position, it would be extremely desirable to exert fine tuned control over Chinese growth. The US *want* economic growth in China but at a level they have an emergency brake on. China is useful as an extended workbench, and long-term growth at levels similar to the US economy are acceptable. However longer periods of unchecked growth are a strategic risk to the US. If the Chinese economy grows at 3 times the rate of the US, say 9-10 percent vs the already good 3%, do the math where this puts China in a number of years. Anyone who even read the Sept. 2002 national security strategy slightly between the lines knows that the US have recognized as the central strategic threat to their dominance, of course not terrorism, but uncontrolled economic prosperity of other nations.
Besides putting the Chinese in a pen, swing control also gives the US some nice new implements for the 'big stick' toolbox. Take Russia. The biggest devastation to Russia in terms of power potential was not the collapse of the Soviet union, but the wholesale annihilation of its economic potential through the Yeltsinite 'reforms' through Gaidar et al. and the 'Harvard hyenas'. All that is behind Putin´s policy and the Khodorkovsky trial is the reassertion of control over vital economic interests such as the oil business. The capital inflow from the consolidated oil sector has Russia for the first time in almost 15 years given the chance to actually expand investment into space and military spending. Now guess what happens if the oil price goes on a controlled decline, the first country to lose profitability is Russia. Saudi Arabia can still make a profit at $10 per barrel, the Russians will be blue in the face at $20.
Other possible targets would be Venezuela. The frustrating thing for the US right now is that, whatever one thinks of him, Chavez is now in the situation that he can finance social programs for the poor *without* having to pressure the economy with unbearable taxes. However, if the oil price gets fouled up, the situation changes. So besides being able to control decisions of *oil-consuming* nations like China, it is also possible to very strongly influence many *oil-producing* countries. Any country that depends for almost all of its income on oil, is extremely vulnerable to manipulations of the oil price.
Now one can ask, if having direct control of a swing capacity is such a nice thing, why havent the US done this years or decades ago? Well, there are a number of factors. Go back to the 40´s/50´s and almost all the oil was totally in the hands of US and British companies. Governments that tried to change it were easily toppled (Iran, Mossadegh). Then came the wave of nationalisation in many Arab countries that could not so easily be countered as before, as they were backed by the USSR and just trying to regime-change them all carried a high risk of all out war. The 1980s and 90s brought concomitantly the deterioration of Soviet power and the Arab nationalist states. Bush I or CLinton could have carried out the same policy as Bush II but didn´t, due to a different philosophy of American hegemony.
In this context it´s clear that the American strategy is embarassed much more by not having a greater flow of oil out of the occupied territories, than by any question of 'democracy' or 'stability' or even finding WMD.
Iraq has very simply been the victim of extremely cynical strategic maneuvering. As the slips by Perle et al regarding the true meaning of the WMD excuse show, Iraq was chosen because the US felt it was the target were they could propagandistically easiest get away with this strategy. Regardless of whether the terrorists really came from Saudi Arabia or the real WMD proliferation threat is Pakistan or whatever.
However in my opinion the strategic leverage over oil isn´t the only motivation behind the attack, and possibly even one of the less sinister ones.
 
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Abu Khaleel and All other Oil Control Theorists:

Please state something other than the obvious. The only reason Iraq has global strategic significance is its large oil reserves, access to the Persian gulf, and location next to the even larger reserves and production capacity of Saudi Arabia. Thus, it is absolutely obvious that “control” of oil was a factor in the U.S. invasion (as it will be in nearly all important international and domestic political issues concerning Iraq for the next fifty years).

There are several fundamental flaws in your collective “oil control” conspiracy theories. First, if Iraq increases oil production at the behest of the U.S., the others in OPEC can agree to commensurately cut production to stabilize prices. In other words, oil is a fungible commodity. The OPEC countries are far better off selling a small percentage less oil per participant at higher prices than pumping at maximum capacity for significantly lower prices. In the long term, prices will be set by global forces effecting supply and demand. Any increases in Iraqi production are not likely, standing by themselves, to be sufficient to drive world prices (although they will have some affect). If Indian and Chinese demand for oil continues to increase at anywhere near their current rate, there will be more than enough demand to stabilize prices with a zone comfortable to OPEC no matter how high Iraq can crank up its production levels. Thus, control of Iraqi production would not give the U.S. the ability to manipulate prices.

On the other hand, if the U.S. could control Iraqi, Saudi and Kuwaiti production, then it would have control over enough of the global production capacity to have a significant effect on pricing. However, such a plan would require invasion and occupation of those other countries as well. The massive cost of such long term occupations, assuming active local resistance, is unlikely to be covered by oil revenue, particularly if one also assumes a sustained period of local sabotage to the oil infrastructure.

Second, the U.S. already controls China’s access to oil. China’s oil supply largely is shipped via tanker. The U.S. navy controls the sea lanes and could drastically reduce China’s oil supply, at will, if it wished. Overland pipelines will reduce Chinese dependence on tankers somewhat, but even those are vulnerable to attack during times of conflict. Further, the U.S. is also China’s primary export market. Thus, China’s industrial expansion requires relatively robust U.S. demand to sustain it. For all of these reasons, economically, China’s fait is likely to be tied to the U.S. for the foreseeable future.

Third, your American “oil control” theories suffer from that lack of a realistic mechanism for it to control the Iraqi government's oil decisions. Even if Iraq could, single handedly control price through its production levels, no Iraqi elected official is going to commit political suicide by over producing in an attempt to significantly lower world oil prices. Assuming a compliant general could be found, the U.S. would have to arrange a coup. Then, the problem would become, how the U.S would hope to hide its manipulations of Iraq's decision to commit economic suicide (at a time of great financial need). The answer is that this is simply impossible.

Then, the final question becomes, assuming a successful coup, how long would it take before there is a general revolt joined by all of Iraq's citizens, not just disaffected Sunnis? The only way to put down such a rebellion would be with totalitarian measures (slave labor camps, mass executions) that would make even Saddam blush. As the U.S. public would be the neo-con's cannon fodder in such a scenario, we would need to support such totalitarian measures all in the name of transparent neo-con manipulation of energy prices. This is an absolutely ridiculous premise since current U.S. polls show that, even now, support for the Iraq Invasion continues to decline.

As I said at the outset, the invasion was related to oil, just not "control" in the sense that other commenters have posited. The long term threat of Saddam having the ability to disrupt world energy markets by acquiring nuclear weapons was the most likely scenario that animated the Bush administration to action. The thought of having the world economy subject to Saddam's irrational whims was probably more than they could bear. Thus, in a sense, the invasion was about control of oil, but not its control by the U.S. Instead, it was about preventing Saddam from eventually acquiring control over the oil of his neighbor’s oil production through some combination of nuclear blackmail or military conquest. Such a thesis was set forth prior to the war in the book, The Threatening Storm, by Kenneth Pollack, a former Clinton Administration Official, one of the few foreign policy analysts who predicted Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait, and a director at the center-left Brookings Institute. The link for a detailed review of his book is http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2001/0211.marshall.html .
Mark-In-Chi-Town
 
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If we wanted Iraq's oil for cheap, we would have kept saddam in power and bargained with him for it. Proof? oil is no $50 a barrel, vs $20 2 years ago.

We take a country then give it back to the people - how is that 'taking' something? That is giving Iraq a gift. ... Deposing saddam was proof we had *higher* motives than oil. Namely, we knew our security long-term was better off with a democratic Iraq than with a saddam-led Iraq.

"Bush and Cheney were both oil industry executives, so they have a special interest in Iraq's national resource. "

silly comment as silly as: Bush and Cheney are baseball fans and Bush was a baseball team manager ... so obviously they invaded Iraq to start another baseball franchise.
 
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"Another factor that sometimes pops up is the fact that Saddam wanted to start trading oil in Euros and not dollars. Given that the US Dollar is essentially underwritten by oil,"

Spoken like someone who is completely ignorant of international economics.

Oil is traded on the spot market - it doesnt matter what currency its traded in, our trade deficits and accounts would be exactly the same, since Euro and dollar are indepent floating currencies. Money is a unit of value, is all, and every day oil is quoted in both dollars and Euros (and Yen) on various oil exchanges (New York, London, Tokyo, etc)
 
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The general flaw in these conspiracy-theories is that Iraq is becoming a democracy ... IRAQ FOR IRAQIS.

There is no US control there, nor ownership.

"As I said at the outset, the invasion was related to oil, just not "control" in the sense that other commenters have posited. The long term threat of Saddam having the ability to disrupt world energy markets by acquiring nuclear weapons was the most likely scenario that animated the Bush administration to action. The thought of having the world economy subject to Saddam's irrational whims was probably more than they could bear. Thus, in a sense, the invasion was about control of oil, but not its control by the U.S. Instead, it was about preventing Saddam from eventually acquiring control over the oil of his neighbor’s oil production through some combination of nuclear blackmail or military conquest."

This is the only sensible comment I've seen that ties one to the other.

The US felt that irrational+evil+dictator+ terrorist-supporting+WMD-pursuing
+ oil-controlling ... was too potent a combination to have in the post 9/11 era.
 
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Bruno:

No offense taken, I truly believe in unfettered exchange of ideas and opinions, as long as it is done in a civil manner.

Your analysis of my alleged “four assumptions” contains serious flaws (I also hope that you are not offended by my tendency to be blunt). As to the first assumption, it was not that Saddam was a “nut,” but that he was a habitual military gambler who was excessively ambitious. You are correct in your tacit assumption that his military ambitions were regional, not global. However, it was his ambition, strategic location, access to substantial oil wealth to purchase or build weapons, and almost complete lack of concern for the suffering those ambitions might cause others, that combined to make him a very dangerous man. His long term plan to develop nuclear weapons (along with missile technology) to dominate his neighbors (excluding Iran, which would simply have develop its own) had a realistic hope of success. With A.Q. Khan selling nuclear technology on the cheap to Middle Eastern regimes, Iraq could have developed a bomb very soon after it managed to get sanctions lifted. Thus, he was no “nut,” just a very, very dangerous despot.

2. The combined Saudi and Kuwaiti armies are a joke. They would have no hope against a rearmed Saddam (even absent an Iraqi nuclear capability). The only neighboring military power of real substance, Iran, would be unlikely to be drawn into such a fight to defend those two relatively hostile Sunni regimes, unless it did so to "liberate" persecuted Shia minorities in Saudi Arabia. Assuming that Iranian troops took possession of any Saudi oil field, I doubt they would ever leave.

Your point about Israel actually supports, rather than refutes the Pollack hypothesis. To wit, Israel has nuclear weapons; its neighbors do not. Thus, the Israel example demonstrates that a nuclear armed Saddam could likewise dominate his non-nuclear neighbors. Also, Israel could not be counted on as a regional power that would rebuff Saddam's march across the gulf since it would not risk nuclear war with Saddam to serve as a proxy for Western Oil interests. This because Saddam's nuclear threat would not be merely economically troubling to the Israelis, but rather, would be an existential threat.

3. This time your just plain wrong (again, the bluntness thing). Pollack correctly points out in great detail why international support for the Iraqi sanctions regime was crumbling (I suggest you buy the book). The extensive French, Chinese and Soviets commercial ties with Saddam had turned them largely into his advocates for lifting sanctions. Saddam had correctly surmised that time was on his side, if he kept his sanctions violations (he was always pushing the envelope, even after he decided to be the “good Saddam” until sanctions were lifted) to an internationally acceptable level. Once the broad economic sanctions were lifted, any residual "arms embargo" on Iraq would have been ineffectual. In any event, once Saddam was no longer motivated to be the “good Saddam” in order to get the U.N. sanctions lifted, A.Q. Khan's group could have easily supplied nuclear weapons technology as neither of them would have been dissuaded by any “arms embargo.” As we know from the Iranian and Libyan situation, it is relatively easy to hide a clandestine nuclear weapons program from international inspectors.

4. This one doesn't really make sense to me (this time, really, really blunt). As I have stated before, the U.S. is basically a status quo, free trading economic power. Providing security so that Middle East oil production is readily and steadily available to world energy markets is in United States interest to keep prices stable. It also, happily, happens to be in the best interest of the rest of the world, including the OPEC producers (M.E. regional insecurity = artificially high prices that suppress demand and make alternative energy sources more attractive). Both the U.S. and international economy are at their most efficient when supply is steady and prices are moderate. This raises the standard of living world wide.

As to assisting in rebuilding a war ravaged country of an enemy state, the U.S. has also done the same in Germany and Japan. There was also an element of self-interest in those situations since the U.S. viewed them both as potential long-term strategic allies and trade partners. Since a healthy, stable and prosperous Iraq (thereby ensuring steady oil exports) is important to the world economy, helping to rebuild both its economy and government institutions are also in the U.S. self interest.

Mark-In-Chi-Town
 
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America are stoogez
 
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